You may (or may not) have noticed a number of current and former Mormons hang out on the j-blogs. I've always wondered why. To help shed some light on the issue C. L. Hanson author of Exmormon will guest blog a post on that very topic. C. L. Hanson also blogs at Letters from a broad....
Look for the post next Monday, October 6th.
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In this fascinating video from a TED conference psychologist Jonathan Haidt discusses "five moral values that form the basis of our political choices". My thoughts follow the video below.
Run time - 18:42
I think Haidt's analysis really captures the essence of the two main approaches to life. Further, in my experience as someone who has been on both sides of the divide (formerly religious conservative and now liberal) I agree with what he identifies as the five "best" matches for the foundation of morality. Personally I think he is spot on. What do you think?
11 comments:
He's partially spot on. He's arbitrarily targeted 5 areas all of which conservatives value and 2 of which liberals value. There are other values liberals value that conservatives don't, and this could make the argument seem like it supports his view as if a 5-2 score could be applied.
But put that aside - I agree we need the liberals distrust of authority and team-think because we see it too often this thinking doesn't serve to stabilize society or reward social thinking, but rather serves only to conserve itself for its own sake.
Yet ironically, liberals generally see the value of more governance as a solution, while those who desire stability most want less governance. What's going on?
The key to the puzzle is to allow societies to coalesce into sub-socieities that are enabled by government, but not powered by government. That would work fabulously if those sub-societies behaved like societies rather than preserving themselves for the sake of preserving themselves and not to convey some substantive value to the society and next generations.
Our own Jewish society is now completely unlike the Pharisean society that established Rabbinic Judaism, and much more like the Tzadokian elitism of the conservatives. It was precisely his point, I think, that the liberals possess the creative power to build and depend on the conservatives to maintain things even as the liberals try to question how that maintenance is happening. That tension is what keeps communities dynamic rather than static, and therefore able to meet the needs of those who are growing within them.
And then you have the current situation - hardly any growth or change, a corrupt leadership concerned largely about matters of status and form rather than substance and meaning, and people therefore needing to privatize and withdraw from their communities just to maintain sanity.
Both the liberals and the conservatives aren't doing their jobs. The liberals and the conservatives are too enwrapped in slogans and form to focus on whether there is anything substantive to what they're saying, and this professor's lecture is a great first salvo in the effort to call out the king for what he is - NAKED. It's time for both to see each other as part of the same team, assuming liberals can get their arms around that and conservatives can welcome them.
Just as there is no law without government there is no morality without religion.
I guess you could argue that your definition of terms is so narrow as to make this assertion of yours true,JP. But just as there is law without government there is morality without religion. One example - do you think that people drive on the proper side of the street because it's the law, or because they don't want to kill or to be killed? Do you think the desire not to kill or to be killed exists only because religion taught them this? Naw. I don't dispute the value of religion or government, but I think that statements such as yours JP are just a tad too dogmatic.
About a year ago Haidt wrote an essay in Edge:
http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/haidt07/haidt07_index.html
where he explains these ideas. Very interesting stuff. I think it helps put religion in perspective. The problem of course is that the 3 "conservative" values are very culture/religion specific and end up being a source of conflict between cultures.
fievel, what's your email?
Of course there is morality without religion. But the question is: Does not every moral system convert into something similar to religion? Is environmentalism or communimism or respect of the Universal Declaration of Human rights not in itself something like a religion? And can an authority who enforces those kinds of "moral codices" not have the same problems as "religious authorities" in one point of time? And can not any moral codex be abused and misused, in the same way as religion?
Shoshi, I think the linchpin is the matter of "enforcability", and then to analyze what's being enforced.
And, enforcement implies a leadership of sorts and consent of the people who are led.
These also imply "community".
They do not necessarily imply commonality with regard to hashkafa and that's the fulcrum that separates the species of moral systems you seem to think should be seen as one (in my mind, anyway).
A person may agree with another that genocide ought not be done, but one will believe it for utilitarian reasons, and the other for moral reasons. Both co-exist in the same community because the result of their moral views can be enforced to the same end, but their worldviews are entirely different.
For an example closer to home, saving the life of a non-Jew at the expense of being mechalel shabbat is pretty much universally demanded of Jews, but the reason for saving a Jew in such a situation is different (intrinsic value of his potential to perform mitzvot should he live) than it is for the gentile (political reasons largely). Could Jews who think this way be said to share the same "moral system" as another person who'd save all lives because he considers them "tzelem elokim" and of equal value for this reason?
So what's a "moral system", and what makes it "moral"? If it's only the result that's examinable and enforceable and not the reasons that motivate the results, then you find yourself with substantive differences in motivation existing in the same community. I believe that when there is no base of shared values on key issues to unite them into a system, you don't have a "moral system".
With communism and humanism at least, they are trying to enforce the substance rather than the form (probably succeeding no better). Is that better? Not sure. But it's important to your definition of a "moral system" to define what you consider "good" vs. merely "good enough".
My problem with our Jewish "moral system" is that it has frayed at the edges regarding enforcement of substance, focusing always on enforcement of form. In my view, this approach is lazy, squishy, and undermines the moral system that Judaism was designed to convey and develop. I think it also undermines us as moral individuals. A moral system built on form is better than nothing, but we can definitely do better, I think. It seems to me that the Tanaaim up til the rabbis of about 400 years ago were flexible (tendetious?) enough to bend the form around the substance, but since 400 years ago and especially in the last 50-100 years, substance gives way to form almost every time. Pity.
Fievel - nice to see you again.
What struck me about the vid is this openness to experience thing. On a scale of 1 to 10, I'd give myself an 8. And I'm pretty liberal. So that checks out.
Like you, LNM, I have bounced between both extremes. I was a black hatter for almost ten years. I think one thing that this guy does not address enough is the intellectual rationale side of things. Fundamentalist religious folks take stances because they believe these stances are dictated by God. When I realized that God's word was actually much more complex than I was originally taught, it freed me to take more liberal positions.
Fievel,
I don't understand what you mean by "form" and "substance" when it comes to morality. Is moral theory the "form" and practice the "substance"? Because at the end of the day a person's action is what counts, not his philosophy.
That hypocrisy exists is nothing new. Among the religious it takes the form of hyper-rightiousness (like tax-evading Hassidim), and among others it appears as social norms that cover up underlying problems (like America's puritanical attitude about obscenities or sex on television, while pornography and prostitution is rampant).
I do agree that that early rabbis had more moral courage than those now, and modern rabbis' unwillingness to overule an ancient rabbinic ruling, no matter how absurd, is very frustrating.
"Is moral theory the "form" and practice the "substance"?
No. Halachic behavior without attachment to a base of values is the "form" of Jewishness without the "substance" of Jewishness.
Because at the end of the day a person's action is what counts, not his philosophy."
Says who? Who says it's not both, or that form without substance is completely meaningless? And for whoever says it, what makes his assertion so convincing to you that you state it as fact when it is not any such thing?
Your question, and Jewish Philosopher's point before yours, presumes (it seems to me) that the alpha and omega of Jewish communal behavior is found in the 4 amos of halacha (the science of measuring good enough, but not the science of measuring good), which might be true if we defined that broadly enough to include a myriad of things that are not halacha at all but are better defined as "socialization".
I assert that most of Jewish communal behavior is socialized - learned while living it, a combination of assumptions about leadership, action (such as your first sentence that I quoted above), rabbis, politic, non-Jews, non-religious Jews, money, yichus, etc. that are extra-halachic - we learn all the unwritten rules that corral us into a hashkafic outlook that we reinforce by interpreting halacha to buttress our prejudices.
When hashkafa serves halacha rather than the reverse, you have a system that is primarily of "form" rather than "substance".
An example:
A person with a substantive approach to schita would not only focus on the technical obligations for creating kosher meat, but as well he'd be cognizant of how the rules of schita are designed to humanize this very violent necessity of gaining our food from animals.
Do people who think an animal's pain is a non-issue internalize the substance or only the form of schita? I'm not arguing about whether the food is technically kosher - I'm asking about whether a butcher who has no concern for the pain of the animal is the kind of man who should be shechting animals if it's G-d's values that demands of him that he be empathetic.
Do those who use the technical minutia to grimace at rabbanut schita as though it's treif (and as though the people who depend on rabbanut schita are treif) and rather favor badatz schita do so because of a devotion to G-d, or rather a devotion to their superior image of themselves and their lifestyles?
I think the answer becomes clear what I mean by "form" and "substance" when you contemplate this example.
But let's not take the easy way out - let's say there is a competing value - that of livelihood - that could result in the loss of many jobs if we cared about the pain of an animal. How do you parse out "right behavior" when there are conflicts?
Or what about the hareidim in Israel who demand millions of dollars be spent everytime a grave is found under a road to prepare the site according to halacha. Someone decided that those millions of dollars are better spent doing this than in feeding those who are still alive, but has anybody actually made such a VALUE decision, DRJ? No. The "actions" rather than the "philosophy" you speak of is focud 3 inches in front of their noses, and I claim that's to the detriment of what you and I call "Judaism".
THIS is why substance is so important, DRJ. If you have no focus on substance, then all that matters is who has the most power to force their desires (the way konoim do in just about everything). Power plays do not have pedagogical properties. They turn people away from Judaism, as they have 80-90% of us already.
"That hypocrisy exists is nothing new. Among the religious it takes the form of hyper-rightiousness (like tax-evading Hassidim), and among others it appears as social norms that cover up underlying problems (like America's puritanical attitude about obscenities or sex on television, while pornography and prostitution is rampant)."
So? All this proves is my point that it's the unwritten laws that influence whether the written laws are related to as form, or as substance, or as form shaped by substance. It's hardly hypocricy if your values tell you that a rabbinic sanction is all you need to permit such behavior. The problem is with those who think rabbinic sanction is what's relevant to defining behavior as "proper".
"I do agree that that early rabbis had more moral courage than those now, and modern rabbis' unwillingness to overule an ancient rabbinic ruling, no matter how absurd, is very frustrating."
Amen. So, what would you recommend? I see nothing short of a full coup de tat against the rabbinate as having a chance. But obviously that's not going to happen.
Not that that would work either - who's to say what would result would be better in an era where nobody thinks of values anymore? Where your Jewishness is measured by the type of headcovering you wear?
Jews need to take their communities into their hands and stop acting as though it's all "b'seder" just because they have some rabbi to give a stamp of approval on their behavior. As far as I'm concerned, there is only one stamp of approval that's worth anything and that I'm interested in and that's that of G-d Himself and in this regard his approval relates (I assert) to our values and how our behavior is shaped by those values.
Action of itself without this thought has no power to build us as humans, nor our communities as communities.
By "moral system" I mean a system that defines, to a group of people, what is "good" and what is "Bad".
And we see, practically, that there are different "moral systems" in this world. Perhaps they have some things in common, but there will also be substantial differences.
In the end, Judaism fixes a "moral system" that defines what is good and bad. So does the Universal declaration of Human rights. Or the communist pary. Or the environment protection charta.
I think that any of these systems can be used for good or abused for bad. I think that in any of these systems, there are shortcomings and injustices. And I believe that there will always be people whom one system suits more than the other.
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